CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President of the United States

A key factor in SALT II — and in all our dealings with the USSR — is Moscow's view of American strengths and weaknesses. The attached memorandum addresses that question and will, I hope, be useful in Saturday's discussion at the National Security Council.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger

Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs)

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W. E) Colby

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller

Member

President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board

A key factor in SALT II -- and in all our dealings with the USSR -- is Moscow's view of American strengths and weaknesses. I am sending the attached memorandum on this subject to the members of the National Security Council and the WSAG.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: The Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll Deputy Secretary of State

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Memorandum for: The Honorable William P. Clements Deputy Secretary of Defense

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W. E. Colby

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: Mr. William G. Hyland Director of Intelligence and Research, State Department

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: Maj. Gen. Edward B. Giller (Ret.)

Assistant General Manager for

National Security

Atomic Energy Commission

A key factor in SALT II -- and in all our dealings with the USSR -- is Moscow's view of American strengths and weaknesses. I have sent the attached CIA memorandum on this subject to the members of the NSC and the WSAG.

W. E. Colby

Director

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: Admiral George Anderson

Chairman

President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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Memorandum for: General George S. Brown, USAF

Chairman

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Memorandum for: Mr. Raymond Wannall

Assistant Director, FBI

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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Memorandum for: Mr. William M. Morell, Jr.

Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for National Security

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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Memorandum for: Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.

Director

National Security Agency

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 September 1974

Memorandum for: The Honorable Kenneth Rush

The Counsellor to the President for

Economic Policy

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V. F. Colby

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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Memorandum for: The Honorable James R. Schlesinger

The Secretary of Defense

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